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Environmental Justice: Where are the Fracking Sites?
Elizabeth Adams
Abstract
This paper looks at the variables that determine the location of hydraulic fracturing
wells. Using cross-sectional data on Texas counties, we test whether county
income level and the percentage of the population that is minority are significant
indicators of well location. This study mirrors other studies that focus on the
location of undesirable land uses such as landfills. Our study finds that income
level and the size of the minority population are not statistically significant
indicators of hydraulic fracturing well location.
I. Introduction
The method of hydraulic fracturing used in the oil and gas industry has
been utilized for many years. More recently in the natural gas industry, the method
of hydraulic fracturing, commonly known as fracking, has been combined with
horizontal drilling in order to access more gas from each well. The well not only
extends vertically into the deep shale basins, but also horizontally from the kickoff
point up to 10,500 feet outwards (Hydraulic Fracturing). This new technique as
well as the discovery of Marcellus shale along the east coast has brought fracking
to the attention of the public at large. The potential environmental and health
impacts of fracking wells on the surrounding area will be discussed later in the
paper and are widely debated. The question of interest for this paper, however, is
how great is the impact of local income levels and other demographic measures
as indicators of where natural gas wells are located.
The question this paper focuses on is interesting because it investigates
one example of externalities resulting from natural resource extraction. The
difficulty of these externalities is balancing the need for the service with the
unaccounted for cost of accessing it. To explore this a bit further, consider that
natural gas could be the solution to the United States’ dependence on foreign oil
because the country has many large shale deposits, the rock formation that holds
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the natural gas. Natural gas would also boost the economy as a new area of
development. It burns cleaner than other widely used fossil fuels so it could help
solve problems with greenhouse gas emissions. The downside of this venture
is the externalities that come from drilling natural gas wells. Research is just
beginning to emerge on the health impacts of hydraulic fracturing wells for people
and the environment. This makes it difficult to form a strong argument for the
existence of this particular negative externality. Instead, this paper will simply
look at where these wells are being located.
The initial motivation for this paper is the current debate on Marcellus
shale. Watching the documentary Gasland serves as further inspiration because
the families that seem to be dealing with the problems associated with natural
gas wells appear to have lower incomes. The idea for the model used in this
paper is inspired by the models set up by Boer et al. and Pastor et al. These
two articles investigate the claims of environmental racism with regard to the
location of treatment, storage, and disposal facilities (TSDF). The research in
this paper applies a similar model to the location of natural gas wells, which will
be discussed further in the literature review section. Texas counties are the focus
of this analysis because data is most easily accessible for this area on all of the
variables included in the model.
Assuming that there is some negative externality from natural gas wells,
whether it is the loss in land aesthetics or water contamination, our interest is in
the equality of the distribution of this externality. Economists are interested in the
location of sites that result in some negative externality, such as hazardous waste
facilities and landfills, to see whether they are disproportionately located near a
certain portion of the population. This new area of interest has culminated as the
environmental justice movement. Environmental justice “is the principle that all
people and communities are entitled to equal protection of environmental and
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public health laws and regulations” (Brulle 2006). Is there environmental justice
in the location of natural gas wells? Similar questions have been asked by other
researchers but we have not found another paper on the application to the natural
gas industry.
There are three economic theories that have been developed that
pertain to the issues highlighted by the environmental justice movement:
discrimination, the Coase theorem, and the theory of collective action (Hamilton
1993). Discrimination and the theory of collective action are the main points
made by researchers in support of the environmental justice movement. The
results of Hamilton’s study indicate “that firms processing hazardous waste, when
deciding where to expand capacity, do take into account variations in the potential
for collective action to raise their costs” (Hamilton 1993). This is just one
specific, illustrative example of the theory of collective action. Discrimination
is very similar to this but references specific demographic characteristics as the
distinguishing factor in firms’ decision-making with respect to the location of
undesirable land uses.
The Coase theorem alternatively states that “even in the presence of
externalities an economy can always reach an efficient solution provided that the
costs of making a deal are sufficiently low” (Krugman et al. 2007). Applying this
to the location of fracking wells, a well should be located where the benefit from
the wells exceeds the costs. One can argue this theory does not hold true because
the health impact of the drilling exceeds the benefits to the economy. This is
an especially poignant argument today with the recent statement released by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA stated, in response to water
contamination complaints from the community of Pavillion, Wyoming, that “the
explanation best fitting the data…is that constituents associated with hydraulic
fracturing have been released into the Wind River drinking water aquifer” (Llanos
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2011). In the past, EPA studies have supported the findings of the natural gas
companies that fracking does not cause water contamination. New findings may
change the current leniency the natural gas industry benefits from.
Before we discuss the empirical analysis behind the paper further, it
is first important to understand some of the politics behind the controversy of
hydraulic fracturing wells. The main point that will be addressed here is the
exemptions from federal regulations that the natural gas industry has accumulated.
The most notable exemptions are from the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts as
of 1990 and 1987 respectively (New York Times). In 2005, Congress exempted
natural gas drillers from having to provide detailed reports on the potential
environmental impact of some of their activities, thus exempting them from the
National Environmental Policy Act (New York Times). Again in 2005, after an
EPA study was challenged by one of its own members saying that the study’s
conclusions were unsupported and that some members of the study’s peer review
panel had conflicts of interest, Congress still exempted hydraulic fracturing from
the Safe Drinking Water Act (New York Times). Other exemptions for hydraulic
fracturing include from the Superfund Act in 1980, the Emergency Planning
and Community Right to Know Act in 1986, and exemption from the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act in 1988 (New York Times). This relatively large
list of government approved exemptions from regulations that ultimately protect
Americans’ health adds to our interest in the environmental justice claims that will
be investigated in this paper.
II. Literature Review
Our interest in the topic was partially inspired by such articles as “The
Gas Dilemma,” written by Bryan Walsh of Time Magazine that begins by noting
that the great energy potential of natural gas comes with “the catch” that it could
come with significant environmental and social costs. The environmental justice
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movement is interested in such situations as the equal distribution of these costs
across society. The movement has in recent times been gaining attention from
more and more academic literature. The goal of much of this literature is to
determine whether or not demographic inequalities characterize the location of
sites that pose some risk to the surrounding population. Boer et al. considers
the location of TSDF. Other authors have studied the location of other “locally
undesirable land uses” such as landfills (Been 1993). One of these land uses
that has not be researched in depth is the location of hydraulic fracturing wells.
This paper adapts the methods used by other researchers on environmental justice
issues to see if the locations of these wells are characterized by demographic
inequalities.
The known impacts of hydraulic fracturing wells are habitat fragmentation
and the risk of a fluid spill. Hazardous chemicals are used in fracking to break
the shale. When the fluids come back up, they are moved to a membrane-lined
storage pad to dry out so the water from the mixture can evaporate. If the pad
tears or there are heavy rains during this process, these pads can develop leaks or
overflow. A controversial hazard of fracking wells is the potential contamination
of groundwater and more specifically residential wells. This would be caused
by the release of Normally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM). When the
shale is broken, NORMs can leak up through the ground along with some of
the fracking fluids. With these risks in mind, we continue our review of related
studies to see how their methods can be applied to this new land use.
The econometric model used in this paper utilizes variables relevant
to this study from previous literature that also evaluates environmental justice
claims. In many of the other studies there are measures of the presence of an
undesirable land use such as TSDF. This study uses a measure of the number of
wells in a county as the dependent variable (Hamilton 1993, Boer et al. 1997).
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In similar studies there are usually independent variables that account for logical
reasons for the location of such a facility such as community waste generation
or the cost of locating in an area (Hamilton 1993, Boer et al. 1997). The study
presented in this paper similarly uses average land value to account for the cost of
locating a well in a specific area.
In the study done by Boer et al., the authors found both median household
income and per capita income to have statistically significant coefficients so this
study uses median household income because it is less influenced by outliers
(Hamilton 1993, Boer et al. 1997). The final major influence you will see in this
paper from previous literature is the use of simultaneous equations. The use of
this type of model is consistent with the article written by Pastor et al., which
investigates the disproportionate siting and minority move-in hypotheses. This
brief overview justifies the modeling techniques used here because it shows that
while this study explores a different issues, its structure is based on previously
peer-reviewed work.
III. Modeling
The basis of the model in this paper is the question of whether or not
local income levels and other demographics can indicate to a certain extent
where natural gas wells are located. There is evidence both for and against
the hypothesis that these factors do impact well location. One specific claim
related to the environmental justice argument is that firms consider the potential
for communities to mobilize and engage in collective action in deciding where
to locate locally undesirable land uses (Hamilton 1993). Hamilton finds that
commercial hazardous waste firms did take this factor into account in deciding
where to add capacity during the period 1987-1992. His explanation of this result
is that “the differing degree to which groups organize to demand compensation
and raise a firm’s costs of choosing a particular location drives a wedge between
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the social costs of its externalities and the costs voiced through the political
process of its site selection” and therefore challenges the outcome of the Coase
theorem (Hamilton 1993). The location where the potential for collective action
is the least may not be where the damage of its externalities is the least (Hamilton
1993). This is just one piece of evidence from past research that suggests that
demographic characteristics that stereotypically suggest less potential for
collective action significantly impact the location of facilities that bring with it
negative externalities born by the surrounding community.
Other potential evidence that would support our hypothesis would be
if the coefficients on the income and/or the minority population variables are
statistically significant in difference from 0 given our data on fracking wells
and demographics of counties in Texas. Contradicting evidence would be if the
coefficients on the previous variables were not statistically significant yet the
coefficients on the control variables were. To test to see what evidence can be
gathered from this analysis we first used the following model:

The hypothesis is that the income and minority population variables do significantly
impact the number of wells within a county. These two variables are the focus of
this research. The control variables include a proxy variable for the presence of
natural gas (Resource), population size (Population), and the land area of a county
(Land). Hamilton’s paper illustrates the reason why the theory holds that these
two variables may be significant, because stereotypically both low income and
minority communities are seen as having less collective action potential against
such issues as fracking well location. Resource accounts for the fact that firms
will build wells where there is natural gas to extract. Population and Land are
included because they are control variables included in other comparable models
and they account for the fact that the less land there is open, the fewer wells that
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can be built due to the space required for the construction. According to the
Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, each natural
gas well site requires between 3 to 5 acres when fully constructed.
The ordinary least squares (OLS) method is first used to estimate the
coefficients of the multivariable regression but the initial model is not correctly
specified. We find that our initial model has simultaneity bias and correct for this
by using the two-stage lease squares (2SLS) method. Additional variables are
included after further research. The final model we work with is a simultaneous
equations model where Wells and Income are endogenous variables and Resource,
PopDensity, Minority, Value1997, and Education are exogenous variables. The
simultaneous equations that will be estimated are as follows:

Opponents to environmental justice claims argue that firms’ do not choose to
locate an undesirable land use in low income communities. They argue that the
location of the site is due to the cost of land because land costs are usually lower
in low income communities or that low income households often relocate near
these sites because land costs decrease. We do not have panel data to account for
simultaneous changes in number of wells and land value. Instead, we use county
income level as the instrumental variable. This study therefore cannot imply
anything about the firms’ or the communities’ decision making. It is assumed
that county demographics before the more widespread construction of natural
gas wells are determined by the exogenous variable for 1997 land value. It is
also assumed that this land value is equivalent to the price natural gas companies
would have to pay in order to locate a well there. Given these two assumptions,
we can then account for the significance of demographic characteristics and the
included control variables on the number of wells in a county. The hypothesis
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is that county income levels do have a significant impact on the number of
wells located in the county, holding constant the impact of all other explanatory
variables. This hypothesis would support environmental justice claims. We
continue with a more in depth description of the data used in this analysis before
examining the regression results.
IV. Data
The ideal data set would be a panel data set including data on all counties
in the United States for a number of time periods. The data would include
measures of the number of wells built during each time period, the amount of
accessible shale within each county, population density, the average value of
land, the percentage of the population with a college degree, the percentage of the
county population that is minority, and the median income of each county for each
specified time period. Acquiring this data would allow the study to better analyze
the firms’ decisions on locating natural gas wells. By lagging some variables such
as income, the number of wells built in the next time period would presumably
reflect data the decision maker would have from the previous period. With this
data, the impact of demographics such as income level and minority could be
better isolated from the impact of land value on firms’ decision-making. Due to
time restrictions and data availability, cross-sectional data is used over all counties
in Texas, a state with a large presence of the natural gas industry.
A sample of all Texas counties that had appropriate data was included in
this model. This sample of 233 counties only excluded 21 counties due to missing
data. The variables included in the final regression model are Wells, Resource,
PopDensity, Minority, Value1997, Income, and Education. Table 1 includes
descriptions of these variables and lists their sources and Figure 1 provides the
basic statistics on each variable.
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Table 1
Variable
Wells
Resource
PopDensity
Minority
Value1997
Income
Education

Source

Description
Number of regular producing gas wells as of
September 2010

Railroad Commission
of Texas

Gas wells gas production in thousands of cubic
feet; measured from January to December 2010

Railroad Commission
of Texas

Persons per square mile, 2010

US Census Bureau

2010 minority population as percentage of total
population

US Census Bureau

1997 average county market value of acre of land

Texas A&M Institute
of Renewable Natural
Resources

2009 Median household income

US Census Bureau

2005-2009 percentage of population age 25+ with
bachelor’s degree or higher

US Census Bureau

Figure1
.
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5899
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Note that Wells, Income, and Resource have the largest standard deviations
suggesting that these variables vary most about their mean relative to other
included variables. Our empirical analysis may find that the variation in Wells is
best explained by the variation of Income and/or Resource. These observations
are purely speculative.
V. Evidence
As mentioned before, the analysis began with a multiple regression
model that was estimated using OLS. This model was first estimated using a
random sample of 30 counties in Texas. After the data on all counties in Texas
were collected, the regression model was run again with the same specification.
Using the Ramsey RESET test, we found that the old model specification no
longer fit the data. With both regressions there were heteroscedasticity problems,
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which were corrected for by using robust standard errors. The results of these
initial regressions are shown in Table 2.
Table 2
Variables

N=30
P-values

N=30
Coefficients

N=233
P-values

N=233
Coefficients

Resource

0.03

6.49*10-6

0.00

8.64*10-6

Population

0.27

-0.0026

0.07

-0.00039

Minority

0.06

2772.626

0.06

568.54

Income

0.12

0.0758

0.04

0.015

Land

0.28

0.2511

0.11

0.025

After attempting logical model specification changes using OLS regression
methods, the model was tested for simultaneity bias using the Hausman
Specification Test. In this process, we decided to include slightly different
variables reflecting further research. The test results, shown in Figure 2, indicate
that the model does have simultaneity bias because the Prob>F value (0.01) is less
than 0.05. In other words, the impact of the residuals from running a regression
of the reduced form equations is significant in difference from 0. This also means
that there is a feedback loop so to correct for this we construct the simultaneous
equations discussed above and estimate them using 2SLS. The regression results
are shown in Figure 3. Before interpreting the regression results, it is also
important to note that the 2SLS model was also tested to see if Income was a
strong instrumental variable. The Stata output from this test is shown in Figure 4.
The OLS regression of the instrumental variable Income on all included variables
and the identifying variable, Education, indicates that Income is a good instrument
because the Prob>F value (0.00) is less than the 0.05 level of significance so we
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can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on all included variables are 0.
In other words, the Adjusted-R2 is statistically significant in difference from 0.
Figure 2

16

Figure 3
. i v r e g we l l s r e s our c e popde ns i t y mi nor i t y v a l ue 1 9 9 7 ( i nc ome = popde ns i t y mi nor i t
> y v a l ue 1 9 9 7 e duc a t i on)
I ns t r ume nt a l v a r i a bl e s ( 2 S L S ) r e gr e s s i on
S our c e

SS

df

MS

Mode l
Re s i dua l

55314333. 4
144908993

5
227

11062866. 7
638365. 607

T ot a l

200223326

232

863031. 578

we l l s
i nc ome
r e s our c e
popde ns i t y
mi nor i t y
v a l ue 1 9 9 7
_ c ons
I ns t r ume nt e d:
I ns t r ume nt s :

Coe f .
- . 0451702
9. 79e- 06
- . 7137522
- 3. 345217
. 4811013
1916. 833

S t d.

Er r .

. 038675
9. 12e- 07
. 3390545
6. 346545
. 1198733
1743. 2

- 1.
10.
- 2.
- 0.
4.
1.

Numbe r of obs
F(
5,
227)
Pr ob > F
R- s qua r e d
Adj R- s qua r e d
Root MS E

t

P>| t |

17
73
11
53
01
10

0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.

244
000
036
599
000
273

[ 9 5 % Conf .
- . 1213782
7. 99e- 06
- 1. 381849
- 15. 85089
. 2448946
- 1518. 088

=
=
=
=
=
=

233
34. 84
0. 0000
0. 2763
0. 2603
798. 98

I nt e r v a l ]
. 0310378
. 0000116
- . 0456557
9. 160455
. 7173079
5351. 755

i nc ome
r e s our c e popde ns i t y mi nor i t y v a l ue 1 9 9 7 e duc a t i on

Figure 4
.

r e gr e s s i nc ome r e s our c e popde ns i t y mi nor i t y v a l ue 1 9 9 7 e duc a t i on
S our c e

SS

df

MS

Mode l
Re s i dua l

4 . 9 0 2 7 e +0 9
1 . 6 1 6 1 e +1 0

5
227

980540354
71192896. 9

T ot a l

2 . 1 0 6 3 e +1 0

232

90790902. 5

i nc ome
r e s our c e
popde ns i t y
mi nor i t y
v a l ue 1 9 9 7
e duc a t i on
_ c ons

Coe f .
. 0000132
6. 732463
- 142. 6194
. 9108222
244. 3049
41294. 8

S t d.

Er r .

7. 85e- 06
2. 319925
26. 65511
1. 068944
99. 78071
1974. 299

1.
2.
- 5.
0.
2.
20.

Numbe r of obs
F(
5,
227)
Pr ob > F
R- s qua r e d
Adj R- s qua r e d
Root MS E

t

P>| t |

68
90
35
85
45
92

0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.

095
004
000
395
015
000

[ 9 5 % Conf .
- 2. 30e- 06
2. 161121
- 195. 1425
- 1. 195499
47. 6901
37404. 5

=
=
=
=
=
=

233
13. 77
0. 0000
0. 2328
0. 2159
8437. 6

I nt e r v a l ]
. 0000286
11. 30381
- 90. 09638
3. 017144
440. 9198
45185. 09

The p-values for Resource (0.00), PopDensity (0.04), and Value1997
(0.00) indicate that we can reject the null hypotheses that the coefficients on
these variables are 0. In other words, their coefficient estimates are statistically
significant in difference from 0. The coefficients on these variables do all have the
expected sign. The coefficient on Resource is positive, which is logical because if
there is more natural gas in a county, there should be more wells to extract it. The
coefficients on PopDensity and Value1997 are not as expected. This possibly can
be explained by an unaccounted for model specification problem.
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Previous literature has found that there is a parabolic relationship
between the presence of an undesirable land use site and income. Boer et al.
found that “income has first a positive, then a negative effect on TSDF location,
a pattern that likely reflects the fact that the poorest communities have little
economic activity while wealthier communities have the economic and political
power to resist negative environmental externalities.” This finding may also
apply to PopDensity and Value1997. Very desolate areas where land is not
habitable may correspond with a type of land where shale deposits are also not
often found while very populated areas, where water and organic materials are
more abundant, are too populated for the construction of a natural gas well. This
example, purely speculative, describes a similar situation to that found by Boer
et al. A step for further research would be to include a squared term. A similar
example could be constructed for Value1997. This relationship is not accounted
for by the current model and could explain the unexpected sign of the coefficients.
The final observation from this regression analysis that is pertinent to our study
is that the sign of the coefficient on Income, although not significant in difference
from 0, has the hypothesized sign. The coefficient is negative suggesting that
if income increases, the number of wells in that county will decrease, holding
constant the impact of all other variables. The coefficient on Minority is also
negative, contrary to our hypothesis. The weaknesses of this study are the lack of
panel data and the model specification. Further research is needed on this issue
to gain better insight into the location of these wells as the natural gas industry
continues to grow.
VI. Conclusions
Although the model does not indicant that the impacts of income and
minority status on the number of wells in a county are significant, further research
is necessary to look at this relationship across time. We believe that analysis using
18

panel data may find different results or at least offer a more clear interpretation
and application of findings. This study suggests that income and the percentage
of the population that is a minority are not significant indicators of where natural
gas wells are located in Texas counties. These findings challenge claims made by
the environmental justice movement. This does not mean, however, that there is
any less of a need to do further research on the possible health and environmental
impacts of hydraulic fracturing. Further analytical research is needed in on the
issue of fracking well location that can address the issues of the best unit of
observation (county, census tract, borough, etc) that should be used in the analysis
and data limitations. Research is crucial for appropriate policy implementation
and public understanding especially as the natural gas industry expands.
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